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Performing the World: Reality and Representation 
in the Making of World Histor(ies)* 
I will take up a question in this diseussion that has intruded insistently in 
my thinking in reeent years as I have eontemplated the writing and tea­
ehing of world history; a question that arises out of the eontradietory 
demands on our eoneeptualizations of the world of a fluid global situa­
tion. This is the question of how best to eoneeive and organize the spati­
alities of the world in its historieal formations so as to answer to the 
demands both of a eritieal historiography and the publie/pedagogieal 
funetions of history, I The question is one that bears more heavily on the 
pedagogieal funetions of world history, I think, than on its histo­
riographieal premises and implieations. 
lt seems to me that there are two major reasons for the praetiee of 
World history. One is historiographieal. A world or global perspeetive 
makes for better history, first, becausc it enables the pursuit ofhistorieal 
phenomena and processes across boundaries of all kinds, vastly expand­
ing the spaces available for inquiry and explanation; second, beeause it 
opens up historical vision to the proliferation of spatialities and, there­
fore, temporalitics, and allows far a mare eomp\ex understanding of the 
proeesses of history; and, third, in the cognizance of totality that it en­
forees, it enables a more eritieal historieal eonseiousness. Warld history, 
in other words, is not just a subjeet-matter, it is also a methodology that 
at onee complements and challenges other ways of doing history. 
The other reason, equally important, is to foster among srudents and 
the general publie (not to speak of many of our fellow-historians) an 
appreeiation of the politieal, eeonomie and eulrural eonfigurations of the 
world, and of how they eame to be, that may be essential to living in a 
world where diffcrences among humans have aequired unavoidable 
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visibility in their very entanglement, which is the condition of wh~t I 
have described elsewhere as Global Modemity. Such appreclatlon IS a 
necessity not just of teaching in the narrow sense of schooling, but as 
public pedagogy. And it is profoundly political in itsimplication~. 
The contradictory demands presented by the hlstonograp~lcal ~nd 
the public/pedagogical are most readily apparent i.n t~e ways m ~hlch 
we spatialize the past, which will be the focus. of thls d.IScusslon. It IS my 
sense that there is a tendency in most world history wntmg to take as the 
point of departure for historical analysis modem conceptions of hist?ri­
cal spaces, most prominently nations, civilizations and, on occaSlOn, 
even cultures. There are good historiographical reasons for domg so. 
After all, one of the fundamental tasks of history is to find .in the past 
clues to the economic, social, political and cultural formations of the 
present. Contrary to premature declarations of their i~pen~ing demise, 
nations and civilizations still represent the fullest artlculatlOns of these 
formations. "Artifices" of history do not lose their historical signifi­
cance-the power to shape history-simply because they are de~onstrably 
artifices of history. Civilizations, nations, cultures and contments may 
all be constructs of modemity. Having been constructed, nevertheless, 
they have been essential in giving modemity i.ts .s~ap~ and meaning. The 
organization of the world around these spatwhtles IS. part of our con­
sciousness as it should be apparent from the conslderable effort of 
imaginatio~ it takes cven to envisage how the world might .loo~ other­
wise, which, ultimately, is the task of historical deconstructlOn.- The.se 
spatialities present a problem that needs to be investigated, n~t .d.ls­
missed. The goal is to historicize them so as to reveal the spatlahtles 
(and the temporalities that go with them) that are suppresse? whe~ na­
tions, cultures, civilizations, and continents are rendered mto relfied 
subjects of history. 
Still the most compelling reason for such "presentism," if I may 
describ~ it as such is the necessity of meeting the public obligations of 
history: education in the formation of the world as we know it, and as it 
is presently organized, which may enable us to better understand I~S 
workings and problems. In arecent paper, Jerry Bentley refers to t?IS 
requirement strongly as a "moral responsibility.,,3 Whether we concelv.e 
of citizenship nationally or globally, some knowledge of wherc contl­
2 The difficulty is quite apparent in a book such as M. Lewis/K. Wigen, The Mylh 
of Continents: A Critique of Metageography, Bcrkeley 1997 whIch, havmg gone 
through ISO pp. of deconstructing "Illetageography," ends up wlth the same con­
figuration of continents and regions! 
3 J.~H. Bentley, Myths, Wagers, and Some Moral Implications of World History, 
in: Journal of World History 16 (2005), no I, pp, 51-82. 
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nents and nations are located, how different pasts have produced differ­
ent social and political stmctures, or the different value systems we call 
cultures, traditions or civilizations, and how these continue to shape 
behavior in a1l its dimensions is a basic necessity far the responsible 
conduct of citizenship. 
On the other hand, the very reaffirmation of the spaees of nations 
and eivilizations not only serves to legitimate the spaces of contempo­
rary configurations of power, and their projections upon the past, but 
also, for the same reason, reverses the historical processes that produced 
those configurations. Spaces implied by nations and civilizations are 
products, rather than subjects, of complex historical interactions. Greater 
emphasis on these interactions - and the proliferation of spaces it de­
mands - yields a far more eomplieated, albeit anarchic, conception of 
world history. 
This perspective, too, is a necessity (if not actually a product) of a 
world dynamized by phenomena that are increasingly more difficult to 
contain within conventional political and cultural spaces. And it makes 
for better, as weil as educationally more challenging, history. But it does 
come at the cost of relegating to the background - philosophically if not 
historiographically - the spatialities and temporalities that have been 
informed by the organization of the modem world, the historical con­
sciousness they have fashioned, and the powerful part they have played 
in the formation of political and cultural identities. There is a "moral 
responsibility" here, too, but one that calls for a different kind of histori­
cal vision, and is informed by a different kind of politics. 
This may be one important reason presently that the practice of 
world history is haunted by questions that refuse to go away in spite of 
its obvious historiographical and ethical/political promises. There is 
more than one way to think, write and teach world history, with different 
historiographical and political premises and implications, and what 
makes the most sense from one perspective may seem threatening from 
another. I am most interested here in confronting the historiographical 
with the public/political consequences of one version of organizing the 
pas!: world history organized around nations and civilizations. This 
approach to world history also foregrounds recognition that the prob­
lems of world history are problems of history in general at the present 
conjuncture. We are all quite familiar with the controversies over "na· 
tional history standards," and their entanglement in the so-called "cul­
ture wars" in the US, Not only are problems of world history akin to 
problems of national history, but the one is very much part of the other. 
If world history may possibly have more profound implications, it is 
23 
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because it raises questions concerning the very viability, or possibility, 
of history as we have known it. 
Historiographically speaking, what makes world histories based on 
conventional spatialities of nations or civilizations (or cultures, as they 
are sometimes described euphemistically), or even world-systems, seem 
retrograde these days is that these spatialities have bec~me increasing!y 
questionable in the present, raising questions about. thelr deploy~.ent m 
the past. This is by no means to state that they are Irrelevant polItIcally, 
intellectually or historiographically. What is in question is whether they 
are autonomous subjects of history, or subjects to history themselves, 
with all the temporal and spatial implications of such subjection. ~et me 
illustrate by referring to some problems in the study of ChIna, ASla and 
Islam, corresponding respectively to issues of nation, continent and 
civilization. I will take up issues of world-system analysis in the course 
of these illustrations. I choose these three because they have been of 
concern to me in my work, but also because they playamajor palt in 
contemporary geopolitics. 
The "idea" of China has acquired considerable complexity in recent 
years, presenting unprecedented challenges in the writing ~nd teaching 
of Chinese history. The complexity itself is not novel; I denve the term, 
"idea of China" from the title of a book by Andrew March, published 
three decades ;gO.4 China as an imagined entity that has assumed diffe.r­
ent characteristics over time has been the subject of many a splendId 
study, from Raymond Dawson's 5 The Chinese Chameleon. to Haro!d 
Isaacs' Scratches on Dur Mind~. The fact that such studles are stIli 
called for, and produced, mayaIso alert us to contin~ed resistan.ce 
among the general public (here, or in China), as weil as m scholarship, 
to viewing China historically. . 
The present presents its own challenges. The knowledge of changmg 
images of China was not accompanied in the past by any radical ques­
tioning of the realities of China, or of being Chinese. Until only a gen­
eration ago, the dominant historical paradigm identified China wi.th the 
boundaries of the so-called "Mainland China," saw in the unfoldmg of 
the past the formation-in its more culturalist guises, articula~ion - of an 
identifiable "Chineseness," and viewed rcgions and reglonalIsm as lega­
cies to be overcome in the process of nation-building. China in this 
4	 A. L. March, The Idea of China: Myth and Theory in Geographie Thought New 
York 1974. 
5 R. S. Dawson, The Chinese Chame1eon: An Analysis of European Coneeptions 
of Chinese Civilization. London 1967, and, H .. Isaaes, Seratehes on Our Minds: 
Ameriean Vicws of China and India, White Plains, NY 1980. 
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paradigm was not just a nation, it was a civilization, with a "great tradi­
tion" continuous from the earliest times to the present, possibly matched 
only by India - "five-thousand years of civilization," as the common 
cliche would have it. It is fair to say that for all their differences other­
wise, Chinese and non-Chinese historians shared in this common para­
digm. 
The culturalism - and the cliches - persist, but they face new chal­
lenges, not by phenomena that are necessarily novel in themselves, but 
by older phenomena that have been given a new kind of recognition. 
Tenns such as "Greater" or "Cultural" China that have become com­
monplaces of contemporary geopolitics implicitly repudiate the identifi­
cation of the physical boundaries of "China" or "Chineseness" with the 
Mainland. Greater China brings in Taiwan, Hong Kong and the popula­
tions of Chinese origin in Southeast Asia, while Cultural China is global 
in scope, and in its reference to a so-called Chinese diaspora that some­
how retains a fundamental cultural Chineseness against the very forces 
of history." Such a notion of Chineseness carries with it strong racial 
presuppositions. The new visions of China and Chineseness are at once 
imperial in spatial prctensions, and deconstructive in their consequences. 
Spatial expansion of notions of Chineseness brings historical differences 
into the very interior of the idea of China, calling into question the idea 
of China as the articulation of anational or civilizational space marked 
either by a common destiny or a homogcneous culture. The "China 
Reconstructs" of an earlier day has been transfonned in the title of a 
more recent study into "China Deconstructs," foregrounding the emer­
gent importance of regional differences against pretensions to national 
unity.7 And this is not just the doing of non-Chinese scholars of China, 
as the most important challenges to the idea of national or civilizational 
unity and homogeneity come from Taiwan and Hong Kong, bent on 
asserting their local identities against Beijing's imperial ambitions ovcr 
territories deemed to be "historically" Chinese. Ideologically speaking, 
however, it seems to me that the more important effect of these new 
conceptualization of Chinese spaces is in fact the questioning of those 
historical claims - that the history of China may be grasped in tem1S of 
an expansion from the Central Plains outward when it may be exactly 
6 Work ofthis kind has proliferated in recent years. For outstanding examples, see, 
Tu Wei-ming (ed), The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese 
Today, Stanford 1991, and Wang Gungwu, China and the Chinese Overseas, 
Singapore 1992. For "greater China," see the special issue of China Quarterly 
136 (December 1993). 
7 D. S.G. Goodman/G. Segal, China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regional­
ism, London 1994. 
25 
26	 Arif Dirlik 
the reverse: that Jooking from the borderlands in is crucial to under­
standing the formation of so-calied Chinese culture, which may be un­
derstood as a unified culture only in the sense of variations on common 
themes. There is an important recognition here that earlier notions of 
Chinese culture - textbook as weil as popular notions - identified Chi­
nese culture with a textual culture, and textual culture with anational 
identity as Chinese, meaning mostly the culture of the elite. Such identi­
fication has done much to disguise the complexity of Eastem Asian 
cultural formations that has persisted despite political colonization from 
imperial centers, which also would suggest that the cultural formations 
of this region are best grasped in ecumenical terms, rather than by the 
extension to the past of claims of recent origin, most importantly nation­
alism. 
I do not need to belabor here that similar problems plague the very 
idea of Asia, which is even more obviously a creation of modem Euro­
peans (even if the term itself goes back to the ancient Greeks 0; Meso­
potamians). It was through Jesuit maps that Chinese of the Mmg Dy­
nasty found themselves in Asia, and even that did not matter much until 
the nineteenth century when knowledge of geographical location ap­
peared as a necessity of political survival for the Qing.8 Until the mod­
em period, knowledge of what passed for Asia was knowledge of lim­
ited spaces produced by states but also by merchants and travelers. It IS 
fair to say that Marco Polo's Asia was not Ibn Battuta's Asia was not 
Rabban Sauma's Asia or, going back a millenium in time, Faxian or 
Xuanzang's Asia. 9 Whether we speak of premodern world systems or 
8	 For further discussion, see, A. Dirlik, Chinese History and the Question of Orien­
talism, in: History and Theory 35 (1996), 4, pp. 96-118. It was the Jesuit mis­
sionary, Matteo Ricci that introduced "Asia" to Ming thinkers. It is equally inter­
esting that the "idea of Asia" was largely forgotten until it was revived again in 
the 19th century, this time as a serious geopolitical problem. 
9	 Chr. Dawson. Mission to Asia: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Mission­
aries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, New 
York 1955; Ibn Battuta, Travels in Asia and Africa. 1325-1354, Columbia, MO 
1986; R. E. Dunn, The Adventures of Ibn Battuta: A Muslim Traveler ofthe 14th 
Century; Fa-hsien, Record ofthe Buddhistic Kingdoms, Whitefish, MT 2004; M. 
Rossabi, Voyager from Xanadu: Rabban Sauma and the First Journey from 
China to the West, Tokyo 1992. For a Song-Yuan geography, see, Chau Ju-kua, 
His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, 
entitled Chu-fan-chi, tr. by Fr. Hirth and W.W. RockhilI, Taipei 1970. For the 
modern, scientific. erasure of alternative mappings, see, Thongchai Winichakul, 
Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of aNation, Honolulu 1994. These 
mappings, needless to say, are very much entangled in questions of national, 
c1ass, gender and ethnic power relations. 
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Reality and Representation in the Making of World Histor(ies) 
political states, Asia consisted of localized spaces - either for outsiders 
or for insiders, Notions of inside and outside are themselves products of 
modem delineation of spaces; accounts of human motions such as those 
cited above mark passage from one place to another (kingdoms, cities, 
Buddhist monasteries, etc), but, as far as I am aware, not one speaks of 
the crossing of continental boundaries, These spaces were endowed with 
different significations, moreover, depending on the motives and activi­
ties that produced them, so that the same spaces carried multiple mean­
ings - a11 of them contrasting with the reductionist homogeneity of mod­
em "scientific" mapping. 
The multiple "world-systems" Janet Abu-Lughod has identified for 
13 th Century Eurasia suggests some overarching order of world-systems 
and their interactions in the delineation of spaces stretching from one 
end to the other of Eurasia, including large parts of Africa. 1O It is impor­
tant, however, not to aHow the abstract structures suggested by motions 
of commodities to cover over and erase these other spaces that coexisted 
with, and created perturbations, within and across the boundaries of 
world-systems-and contributed to their structuring. It is even more im­
portant to underline here that world-systems, conceived in tenns of 
national or civilizational entities such as the Mongoi, Arabic, Byzantine 
and the Ottoman Empires, or Song-Yuan-Ming China, or the kingdoms 
of the Indian sub-continent, not be a110wed to cover over the immense 
differences within the territories designated by these political entities. 
Abu-Lughod's preferred tenn, significantly is "circuits," referring to 
networks and their nodes rather than entire surfaces. \1 How these "net­
works" contributed to the fonnation of the political entities indicated by 
those tenns is a fundamental question that has priority over the more 
common practice of describing the networks in tenns of the political 
entities - which is putting the fonnation before some of the crucial proc­
esses that wcnt into its making. 
These complexities in the notion of Asia persist to this day, ulti­
mately undennining confidence in the possibility of defining such an 
cntity, or dclineating its boundaries. The appearance or re-appearance of 
a discourse of Asian values since thc 1980s, in its identification of those 
values with values that are at best national or regional in origin, only 
goes to underline the fragmcntedness of thc notion of Asia. The idea is 
to be understood at best as a utopian ideal and, therefore, itself another 
mode of constructing Asia that has many a hurdle to ovcrcome for its 
10 1. Abu·Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World-System A.D, 1250­
1350,NewYork 1989. 
II lbid .. chapter 11. 
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realization. On the other hand, the very effort is indicative of the histori­
cal reality and significance the idea of Asia has acquired regardless of 
who initially constructed it, where, and when. I am not referring here 
only to the persistence of Orientalist notions of Asia in EuroAmerica or 
the reification of Asia in elite and state ideologies in Asia itself, but to 
more radical efforts to find "Asian" alternatives to EuroAmerican he­
gemony that acknowledge the fragmentedness of Asia, and seek on that 
basis to produce a more dynamic conception that brings unity and dif­
ference together dialectically.12 
The third case I would like to use by way of illustration is Islam. It is 
not just George Bush, Samuel Huntington, Benjamin Barber, evangelical 
Christians or fundamentalist Moslems who reify Islam, taking it out of 
history as a civilization or a deviation from it. In the aftermath of 9/1 I, a 
hue and cry went up all over US campuses about the need to find out 
more about Islam. Those who led the demand were usually liberal scho­
lars, inc1uding specialists on Islam, or various Islamic societies. In an­
other example of identifying a "civilization" with a text, the University 
of North Carolina even made selections from the Koran into a required 
assignment for the orientation of incoming freshmen, and got sued in the 
process. Within my immediate circles, everyone wanted to bring an 
Islam specialist into the faculty; few thought or said anything about an 
Afghan, a Central Asian, or a Saudi historian who might have something 
to say about concrete circumstances that produce terrorists: struggles 
within Islamic societies over political, cultural and social differences, 
the entanglement of those struggles within a history of imperialism, and 
resentments bred currently by US colonialism and imperialism, includ­
ing cultural imperialism, against a modernity dominated by the same 
powers that have colonized the many worlds of Islam for more than a 
century, and continue to do so with the complicity of native elites. Peter 
van der Veer has written of the importance of nationalism in the reli­
gious revival in India. 13 The relationship between nationalism and a 
civilization conceived in religious terms is also very much at issue here. 
It is a contradictory relationship, a relationship of unity and opposition, 
that is further exacerbated by c1ass, gender and ethnic divisions which 
12 Editorial, "Problematizing Asia," in: Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, I.I(April 
2000), pp. 5-6. See, also, Young-seo Baik, Conceptualizing 'Asia' in [the] Mod­
em Chinese Mind: A Korean Perspective, in: Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 
3.2(2002), pp. 277-286. 
13 P. van der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India, Berkeley 
1994. 
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are as important in so-called Islamic societies as in others. 14 And yet 
these problems are routinely ignored in the reification of Islam, when it 
is c1ear that such reification no Jonger serves the purposes, as it might 
have a millenium earlier, of unifying either a divided world of Islamic 
societies or their historical "Other," the equally divided world of Chris­
tianity. 
I do not need to belabor here the historicity of Islam, in the sense 
both of its temporal transformations and its spatial diversity. Even in 
Samuel Huntington's delineation of civilizations, Islam stands out for 
the impossibility of locating it within idcntifiable boundaries. 15 Aziz Al, 
Azmeh's Islams and Modernities, to cite one outstanding example, has 
made a cogent case for the diversity both of Islam, and Islamic moderni­
ties. 16 Where factionalism is not suppressed by the domination of one or 
another sect, Islam is divided into competing and conflicting factions, as 
is quite evident in the tragic case of Iraq, or the competition among sects 
that has marked the recent Islamic resurgence in Turkey. 17 The evidence 
of history, once again, seems unable to overcome the weight of estab­
lished traditions - not traditions of Islam, but traditions of scholarship 
and popular imagination. 
My rehearsal of the historicity, boundary instabilities, and internal 
differences - if not fragmentations - of nations, civilizations and conti­
nents is intended to underline the historiographically problematic nature 
of world histories organized around such units. These entities are prod­
ucts of efforts to bring political or conceptual order to the world-political 
and conceptual strategies of containment, sort of to speak. This order is 
achieved only at the cost of suppressing alternative spatialities and tem­
poralities, however, as weil as covering over processes that went into 
their making. A world history organized around these entities itself 
inevitably partakes of these same suppressions and cover-ups. 
It may not be very surprising that as global forces, including forces 
of empire, produce economic and cultural processes, and human mo­
tions, that undermine modernity's strategies of containment, we have 
witnessed a proliferation of spaces, as weil as of claims to different 
temporalities. Perhaps it is living in astate of f1ux that predisposes intel­
lectual1ife present]y to stress motion and process over stable containers; 
traveling theorists are given to traveling theories, as cultural critics from 
14 I have discussed these complications at length in my article "Modernity in Ques­
tion') Culture and Religion in an Age ofGlobal Modernity" far Diaspora. 
15 I am refening to S. P. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
World Order, New Yark 1997. 
16 A. AI,Azmeh, Islams and Modemities, London 1993. 
17M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, New York 2003. 
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Edward Said to lames Clifford have suggested by word or example. 1R 
What is important is that we are called upon to face an obligation to 
view the past differently, to open up an awareness of what was sup­
pressed in a historiography of order, and take note of the importance of 
human activity, including intellectual and cultural activity, in creating 
the world - what I had in mind when I proposed "performing the world" 
as the title for this paper; perfornl in the sense both of accomplishing the 
world and representing it, each one an indispensable condition of the 
other. 
At the same time, in a world that seems to be caught up in a mael­
strom created by forces that are productive at once of homogenization 
and heterogenization, history seems to be receding rapidly into the past, 
even as the past returns to make claims on the present "resurgence of 
history," as the French writer lean-Marie Guehenno puts it in his study 
of the decline of the authority of the nation-state under the assault of 
forces of globalization and the resurgence in response of a conscious­
ness of the local. 19 In the world of Global Modernity, we witness a re­
turn of civilizational claims, bolstered, ironically, by the same destabi­
lizing forces of transborder ethnicities and diasporas, and calling for 
alternative epistemologies and alternative claims to historical conscious­
ness. This is the case not just with the so-ca lied "clashes between civili­
zations." Different epistemological claims mark struggles over the future 
of the same civilization, as in the resurgence of biblical attacks in the 
United States on science and history, which draw upon works that pre­
date-and, obviously, have survived-the Enlightenment. One such work is 
the biblical history of the world written by Bishop lames Ussher in the 
17th Century, which has been reissued recently. This work, Annals ofthe 
World, is apparently quite popular among evangelicals who have used it 
for inspiration in the construction of the proliferating Creation museums 
and theme parks across the United States.20 
The issue here is not merely national against transnational or world 
history, but the proliferation of space that attends the de-privileging of 
conventional modes of conceiving of historical spaces. The very decon­
struction of national or civilizational spaces, in other words, raises the 
question of how to reconstruct history spatially and temporally, if that is 
18	 E. Said, Traveling Theory, in: id., The World, The Text and the Critic, Cam­
bridge, MA 1983, pp. 226-247; 1. Clifford/V. Dhareshwar (eds), Traveling Theo­
ries, Traveling Theorists. Special issue of Inscriptions No. 5 (1989). 
19 1.-M. Guehenno, The End of the Nation,State, tr. from the French by V. Elliott, 
Minneapolis 1995, 
20	 1. Ussher, Larry Pierce and Marion Pierce, in: Annals of the World, Green Forest 
2003. First published in Latin in 1658. 
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indeed a desirable goal. Why put Humpty Dumpty back together again, 
espccially after seeing how much mischief he has done? In many ways, 
this is a fundamental question facing the practice of world history, 
which simply re-spatializes the past, not through a radical reconsidera­
tion of the spaces of history, but simply by rearranging existing spaces 
from a pcrspective that supposedly transcends them all. An anarchist 
(rather than Marxist - as Jerry Bentley would have itl) would see right 
away thc consolidation of hegemony that may be at work in such a rear­
rangement. 
The answer throws us back to the pedagogical functions of history, 
including world history. While we need to insist on a critical apprecia­
tion of the past that vicws nations and civilizations in their historicity, it 
seems to me that if world history is to achieve its pedagogical functions, 
we cannot cavalierly dispense with nations and civilizations in its or­
ganization any more than we can do away with national histories in the 
name of world history, or continents in the name of oceans, localized 
spatialities or networks. 
Is there any way to bring these critical perspectives into history, in 
this case, world history, without falling into some kind of postmodern 
and postcolonial cynicism about past ways of doing history? This is 
probably a problem that will be taken up also by other authors of this 
issue. Here, by way of conclusion, I would Iike to put forth three consid­
erations. 
First, a distinction is necessary, I think, between world history un­
derstood as transnational history, and world history as a history of the 
world. 21 The confusion of these two understandings of world history 
disguises the full significance of challengiilg national histories. The 
transnational is not the same as world-wide. More importantly, perhaps, 
the other side of challenging national history from supra-national per­
spectives is to bring to the surface sub-national histories of various 
kinds. The radical challenge oftransnational history lies in its conjoining 
of the supra- and the sub (or intra)·national - wh ich calls forth an under­
21	 For examples of transnationality, by no means bound to projects of "world his· 
tory," see W. P. Webb, The Great Frontier, Lincoln 1980; 1. Osterhammel, Colo· 
nialism, Princeton 1997; 1. F. Richards, The Unending Frontier: An Environ· 
mental History of the Early Modem World, Berkeley 2003; and, j. C. Weaver, 
The Great Land Rush and the Making ofthe Modem World, 1650-1900, Mont, 
real 2003; and a more rcgionally onented work, R. Karl, Staging the World: Chi, 
nese Nationa\ism at the Turn of the Twentieth Cemury, Durham 2002. Most 
works viewed as world history should, less misleadingly, be described as trans­
national or translocal histories. The confusion points to the hold on the historical 
imagination of "world history" of past legacies. 
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standing of transnational as translocal, with all its subversive implica­
tions historiographically and politically, If national history serves as an 
ideological "strategy of containment," the containment of the translocal 
(as distinct from the world-wide) - as process or structure - is of imme­
diate and strategic importance as it bears dircctly on the determination 
and consolidation of national boundaries, The translocal presents chal­
lenges that are quite distinct from the multi-cultural, which has bccn 
attached to world history , as one of its political and cultural goals. The 
difference may be the difference between abolishing national history (or 
at least cutting it down to size among other his tories) versüs placing it 
within the perspective ofthe world. 
Second is to reconceive nations and civilizations not as homogene­
ous units but as historical ecumenes. 22 This is readily evident in the case 
of civilizations conceived in terms of religions, from which the term 
derives. The volume edited by Michael Adas "Islamic and European 
Expansion: The Forging of a Global Order" provides a good example. 23 
Jerry Bentley suggests in the article to which I referred above that an 
ecumenical approach is necessary to ovcrcoming the Eurocentrism of 
world history. His intention is most importantly ethical. The concept of 
"ecumene," however, mayaiso be translated into a way to grasp spatiali­
ties. I would like to suggest here that the idea of the ecumenical may be 
applied productively to regions, civilizations and continents, among 
other large entities, as weil as to nations; the important issue being the 
foregrounding of commonalities as weil as differences, and recognizing 
a multiplicity of spatialities within a common space markcd not by firm 
boundaries but by the intensity and concentration of interactions, which 
themselves are subject to historical fluctuations. Such an understanding 
of ecumene accords with the term's etymological origins, meaning the 
inhabited or inhabitable world, which is how peoples from the Greeks to 
Europeans to the Chinese conceived of the world, which did not encom­
pass the world as we understand it, but referred only to the world that 
mattered. Tt was modcmity that invented one world out of the many 
worlds of earlier peoples, and even that has been thrown into doubt by 
so-callcd globalization that unifies the known globe, but also fragments 
it along fractures old and new. 
22	 "Ecumene" understood as "areas of intense and sustained cultural interaction:' 
This definition is offered by lohn and leaD Comaroff on the basis of works by 
lJlf Hannerz and Igor Kopytoff, See, l. Comaroff/J. L. Comaroff, Millenial Capi­
talism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming, Special issue of Public Culture 
122(2000), pp. 291-343, p. 294. 
23 M. Adas (ed,), Islamic and European Expansion: The Forging ofa Global Order, 
Philadelphia 1993. 
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If I may i11ustrate by an example from the part of the world I study, 
there has been much talk in reccnt years of a Confucian or Neo· 
Confucian Eastern Asia, and, of course, Confucianism long has been 
held to be a ha11mark of a Chinese civilization that holds the central 
place of hegemony in Eastern Asia. It is interesting to contemplate when 
Confucius became Chinese; when he was rendered from a Zhou Dynasty 
sage into one of the points of departure for a civilization conceived in 
national tenns. When the Japanese, Koreans and Vietnamese adopted 
Confucianism for their own purposes, a11 the time claiming their own 
separate identity, did they do so to become part of the Sung or Yuan or 
Ming, whom they resisted strenuously, or because they perceived in 
Confucianism values of statecraft and social organization that was lod­
ged in the texts of a tradition that was more a classical than a Chinese 
tradition, and which unfolded differently in these different states.24 This 
is what I have in mind when I refer to commonality as weil as differ­
ence, even radical difference. It could be complicated further by the 
extension of the argument to the entanglement of societies in a multi­
plicity of ecumenes. What we call China itself did not simply grow from 
the inside out, radiating out from a Yellow River plains core, but was 
equally a product in the end of forces that poured from the outside in, 
from different directions, producing translocal spaces. These interactions 
of the inside and the outside produced the China we have come to know, 
which once fonned, would contain them, and push their memories to the 
margins. Their recovery toward the center of historical inquiry recasts 
the history of China in more ways than one as I noted above. 
In underlining the overdetermination of parts that res ist dissolution 
into homogenized wholes, my goal is not to do away with history by 
rendering it into a conglomeration of micro-histories. I merely wish to 
illustratc what a radical and thoroughgoing historicism might lead to . 
The paradigm (or metaphor, if you like) is one that may be used produc­
tively in many cases. One of its advantages is that it also allows for 
different parts of the ecumene to react differently-and autonomously­
with parts of different ecumenes. Regions may in some instances serve 
similar functions, but an ecumene conccived not in tenns of physical 
proximity but social and cultural constructions mayaiso be deployed 
across vast distances as, for example, with contemporary migrant popu­
lations sprcad across the globe. 
24 For the most up-to·date, comprehensive and illuminating discussions of these 
issues, see, B. A. Elman/J. B. Duncan/H. Ooms (eds), Rethinking Confucianism: 
Past and Present in China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam, Los Angeles 2002. 
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The third consideration involves the worlding of world history - its 
relationship to living in a world that is as much about difference as it is 
about sameness or commonality. It may be that a day will come when all 
around the world will conceive of the world - and its history - in identi­
cal ways. Until that day arrives, however, we need to be attentive at all 
times to the limited standpoints and visions from which we think and 
write history, regardless of how global or universalistic we may wish to 
be. Societies around the world past and present have thought the world, 
and its history, differently, which must enter as a fundamental consid­
eration into any practice of world history. This requires, I think, that 
world history can be written ultimately only as historiography - as an 
account not just of different conceptualizations of the world, but also of 
different ways of conceiving the past. This needs to be under girded by a 
consciousness of our own place in time; a self-reflexiveness that serves 
as areminder that we are not at the end but somewhere along the course 
of history, and that the very next generation may demand a different 
kind of history than the one(s) that our imagination allows. Awareness 
of spatial and temporal restrictions is crucial, I think, to any critical 
practice of world history. 
These are merely some thoughts toward different modes of thinking 
and writing world history that seek to account for processes of common­
ality and difference, unity and fragmentation, and patterns in motion of 
homogeneity and heterogeneity. Most important in this consideration is 
to fulfill the pedagogical goals of world history - the obligation at the 
most basic level to acquaint students and the public with the whos, whe­
res and whens of other societies - while also informing it with the criti­
cal perspectives demanded by contemporary global transformations-as 
weil as visions of humanity that promise something beyond contempo­
rary ideologies of order. How this may be achieved is secondary to the 
recognition of complexity - even chaos - in the first place. We need to 
remind ourselves that thinking, writing and teaching world history ­
indeed, all history - is not merely an exercise in description but also a 
performance in the double sense I described it above; as accomplishing 
and representing the world - not just what it has been, but what it has 
suppressed in the process of becoming what it is, and what it might yet 
become by recovering what has bcen suppressed. 
The past is not just a legacy, it is also a project. That such an ap­
proach to the past opens it up to the possibility of appropriation for di­
verse political and social causes is a predicament, which may or may not 
be undesirable. How the world appears from different social contexts 
and perspectives, for examplc, would enrich oUf own limited concep-
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tions of the world, which to me appears as adefinite advance even if it 
complicates our tasks as historians, perhaps even makes them impossi­
ble. Then there is the biblical rewriting of history, with its own totalistic 
claims based on blind faith, which is as pernicious in its consequences 
for history as creationism is for understanding human evolution and 
development. All we can do is to acknowledge the presence of such 
alternatives as answering to different social and political needs over 
which the historian does not, and probably should not, have contro!. The 
best we can do is to ask of ourselves what Dur project might be, while 
we remain as tme as possible to the evidence of the past in all its prolific 
variation-including variation over the meaning of the world, and of 
history. 
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